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Wisconsin law is inconsistent as to whether ................... ................... .... . 
day one, the day an action accrues, is to be 
included in computing a statute of ............................... ............ . 
limitations period. Resolving this issue can 
' .............................................. . 
protect the claimant's right and remedy. 
16 
James D. Ghiardi 
Frequently, courts and attorneys are faced with the issue 
of how to compute the applicable period of limitation 
under a specific statute of limitations.' Under the terms 
of section 893.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes,' time is 
computed from the time ofthe accrual of the right to the 
time the action is conimenced. A cont1ict exists betWeen 
the common law rule, that the day of accrual should be 
included in the period of limitation,3 and sections 
990.001(4)(a) and (d) of the Wisconsin Statutes." Since 
sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d) do not, by specific lan-
guage, abrogate the common law, it cannot be presumed 
that the Legislature intended to change the common law. 5 
Sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d) only apply to "acts or 
proceedings" and thus are only relevant to computing 
time where a party is required to do an affirmative act.' 
The accrual of a cause of action in tort does not require the 
doing ofan affirmative act but is based on thediscovery 
of the injury.' Because of?the uncertainty created by 
cases8 applying sections 990.001(4)(a) and (d), lawyers 
have been urged to include the day the action accrues in 
the computation. 9 
The uncertainty continues 
Current Wisconsin law still is fraught with uncertainty 
over determining when a statute of limitations period 
begins to run. The uncertainty stems from the fact that 
Wisconsin case law is inconsistent as to whether day one, 
the day an action accrues, is to be included in computing 
a statute of limitations period. Since there has been no 
definite resolution of this issue by the courts or the 
Legislature, lawyers are proceeding according to their 
advantage. This has resulted in inconsistent holdings in 
Wisconsin court decisions. 
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Circuit court cases 
In Dober! v. Lawien 10 the plaintiff's injury occurred on March 6, J 986. The action was 
commenced on March 6, 1989. The court held that section 990.00 I (4) was not applicable 
and that the last day that the plaintiff could have commenced the action was March 5, 
1989. 
The plaintiff in Elnwre v. StrohBrewery?? 'was it1juredouDec. 8, 1980,and the action 
was commenced on Dec. 8, 1983. The trial court ???? that the action was timely filed 
on the theory that the supreme court's dicta ??  prior decisions12 called for this 
conclusion. 
In Williams v. Town o(Caledonia 13 the trial c.ourt stated: " ... in a tort situation, 
when computing the statute of limitations, because it is from the date- because 
it is the time of an event as .opposed to the date, you inclu?e the first day, 
notwithstanding 990.001, sub. 4a, b, and d.''??? 
The accident in Williams occurred at 11:30 p.m. on Oct 17, 1983. The action 
was commenced on Oct. 17, 1986, at 5:40p.m. The court followed an exception 
to the rule of counting whole days and divided up the day of the acci????
because substantial rights were involved, and held 
that the 5:40p.m. filing of the action was timely.???? 
The trial court acknowledged that ordinarily 
fractions of a day will not be considered, 
particularly in reference to the commence-
ment of an action. However, the court held 
that the ordinary rule will not be applied 
when an inquiry into the priority of acts on 
the same day becomes necessary to protect 
the rights of parties. 16 
Courts of appeal cases 
Th? inconsistency in thetrial courts is echoed in the ????????? 
courts of appeal. 
In Livesey v. Copps C??p.,'?7?a nontort case, ???option 
a period of 12 months "from date of signing" was ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
on Nov. 15; 1976. A written notice that 
option was mailed on Nov. 15, 1977, and ???????? on 
Nov. 16, 1977. The court construed the optio?
language "for a period of 12 months from the date 
of signing" to haveexpired at midnight on Nov. 
15, 1977. In .arriving at its decision, the District 
IV court of appeals considered section 
990.001(4)(a),(b) and (d) of the Wisconsin Stat? 
utes, but held that the common law rule applied 
rather than section 990.001 ( 4 ), stating as follows: 
'"The rule is well established on an issue of 
March 1993 
limitation where the time is to be com-
puted from a certain date, that in the 
computation the day of the date is to be 
excluded, and where rhe computation is 
from a certain event the date of that event 
must be included.' Brown v. Oneida 
Knitting Mills, 226 Wis. 662, 666, 277 
N.W. 653 (1938), quoting from Siebert 
v. Jacob Dudenhoefer Co., 178 Wis. 
191 , 194, 188 N.W. 610 (1922); De 
Forest Lumber Co. v. Potter, 213 Wis. 
288,251 N.W. 442 ( 1933); North Shore 
M. Co. v. Frank W. Blodgett Inc., 2 13 
Wis. 70, 250?N.W. 84 1 (1933). (Empha-
sis in original.)"18 
Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. 19 dealt with a medical malpractice 
issue involving the question of the toll-
ing of the statute of limitations until 30 
days after the Patients Compensation 
Pane?issued its written report. The court 
stated that when the plaintiff fi led her 
submission of controversy on Oct. 30, 
1978, she had four days left before the 
statute of limi tations expired. 20 The al-
leged malpractice occurred on Nov. 4, 
1975, and the submission of controversy 
was filed on Oct. 30, 1978. If plaintiff 
had only four days left , then the court 
counted the first day (Nov. 4, 1975) for 
purposes of computing the time. 
In McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. v. 
Kauffman21 the complaint sought dam-
ages arising out of a fire that occurred on 
March 24, 1981. An action was com-
menced on March 20, 1987, but the 
summons and complaint were not served 
on the defendant. A second amended 
summons and complaint were filed on 
March 25, 1987, and timely served on 
the defendant. The court of appeals held 
that the statute of limitations had run on 
March 23, 1987, and the action was 
therefore time-barred.22 Thus, without 
any discussion or citation of authority, 
the court included the day of accrual in 
its computation of time toward the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. 
The three foregoing opinions would 
indicate that the Wisconsin courts of 
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The inconsistency in the trial courts ..... ... .. .............................................. 
is echoed in the Wisconsin courts of . ........................... ........................... . 
appeal. Until the supreme court clears up ........................................................ 
the confusion, judges, lawyers and ..... ... ................................................ 
litigants must continue to guess when a .......... ................. ...... ..... ... .... .... .. ..... 
statute of limitations period begins to run. ..... ..... ....... .... .... ........ .... ........ ........... 
appeal would follow the common law 
and count the first day in the computa-
tion of time. However, unpublished 
decisions illustrate a continuing incon-
sistency in the case law.23 
Schreiber v. Bennetr24 involved an 
injury to a child at birth. The child was 
born Oct. 21, 1963, and the plaintiffs 
knew almost immediately the precise 
illness that caused the injury. The Dis-
trict Ill court of appeals held that the 
statute of limitations expired on Oct. 20, 
1982, in the absence of the benefits of the 
discovery rule. This was arrived at by 
counting the first day in determining the 
three-year period, and then tolling the 
statute's application until one year be-
yond when the child attained the age of 
majority. 
The District I court of appeals has 
been consistent in not counting the first 
day. In a contract action, Don Devooght 
House Moving v. Keinert,25 the debt ac-
crued on Oct. 28, 1982, and the action 
was commenced on Nov. 15, 1989. 
Without discussion or citation of author-
ity, the court held that since the six-year 
period of! imitations began to run on Oct. 
28, 1982, the time could not be extended 
beyond Oct. 28, 1988. In Johnson v. De 
Clou?6 an automobile collision occurred 
on Nov. 20, 1985. The court stated that 
suit was to be commenced on or before 
Nov. 20, 1988, again without discussion 
or citation of authority. 
Gutweiler v. Wisconsin Farmers Mut. 
Ins. Co.? ? is an unpublished opinion that 
did discuss the issue of whether the day 
of accrual should be counted as day one 
of the statute of limitations. The appel-
late court in Gutweiler was asked to 
decide whetherthe trial court erred when 
it ruled that the day of an accident must 
be included in the computation, so that 
the plaintiff's action, which was filed on 
Nov. 22, 1989, for an accident occurring 
on Nov. 22, 1986, was time-barred. The 
appellate court excluded the day of ac-
crual in its computation and ruled that 
the method of computation provided by 
the general construction statute, section 
990.001(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes, 
which excludes the date of the accident 
from the computation, applied to section 
893.54. The court held that the action 
was timely commenced and reversed the 
trial court. 
The court based its decision on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court' s decisions in 
Hale v. Hale28 and Cuisinier v. Sattler,29 
stating that these cases spoke plainly to 
the circumstances of the Gutweiler case 
and required computation of the periods 
in section 895 .54 and similar statutes of 
limitation to be in accord with the spe-
cific directions of section 990.00 1(4); 
therefore, time is to be computed by 
excluding the ????? day and including the 
last. The Gutweilercourt acknowledged 
that if it were a law-declaring court it 
might give one commentator's recom-
mendations?30 greater consideration, but 
that as a court whose functions are pri-
marily error-correcting, it was bound by 
the decisions of the state's highest court. 
It should be noted that the decision makes 
no reference to two prior decisions by the 
same court holding to the contrary. 31 The 
failure to consider or acknowledge prior 
authority in current decisions has been 
noted by one author as creating a serious 
dilemma for judges, lawyers and li ti-
gants.32 
(continued on page 53) 
WISCONSIN LAWYER 
Computing 
time ifrompageJBJ 
Supreme court cases 
Despi te several opportunities since 1981 
to clarify the issue of whether the fust 
day is to be counted in computing time 
for the purposes of the running of the 
statute of limitations, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has not expressly done 
so. In Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co. 33 the issue of when the statute 
of limitations expired was considered in 
Light of a f??ing with the Patients Com-
pensation Panel and the "continuous treat-
ment" doctrine. The issue of counting 
the first day never became dispositive of 
the case, but the court gave mixed sig-
nals on the issue. The trial court and the 
court of appeals34 had impliedly counted 
the first day and this was confirmed by 
the supreme court 
"It is conceded by all parties that, 
when Tamminen filed her submission of 
controversy with the patients compensa-
tion panel on Oct. 30, 1978, four days 
remained before the statute of limita-
tions ran out on the earliest claimed 
negligent act of the defendant Kiskeh, 
the surgery performed on Nov. 4 , 
1975 .... 35 
"The plaintiff argued in the trial court 
that the statute of limitations should not 
begin to run until the health care provid-
ers' negligence ceased. The trial court 
did not entire ly reject the plaintiff's ar-
gument or the evidence of her affidavits, 
but relied upon the theory, for which it 
couldfind supportin Wisconsin law, that 
each day on which there is a negligent act 
or omission commences the running of a 
period of limitations on a new and differ-
ent cause of action. 
"Under the trial court 's reasoning, the 
statute of limitations begins to run each 
day for the negligent acts or omissions 
which occurred on that day. Thus, the 
trial court determined that the statute of 
limitations barred the plaintiffs cause of 
action with respect to most of the alleged 
negligence, while it did not bar an action 
for negligent acts or omissions that fell 
within the period subsequent to Jan. 12, 
1976."36 
On the other hand, in computing the 
lapsed time before the submission of the 
controversy to the Patients Compensa-
tion Panel, the court did not count the 
first day. "The period of negligent treat-
ment ran from Nov. 3, 1975, to March 
30, 1976. The controversy was submit-
ted to the patients compensation panel 
on Oct. 30, 1978. At that point, two years 
March 1993 
and 21 4 days had elapsed following the 
date of last negligent treatment. At the 
time of the submission of controversy 
151 days remained before the period of 
limitations expired.????? 
In Hester v. Williams38 the court ex-
cluded the day of accrual from its com-
putation of the statute of limitations. 
Hester involved a plaintiff who suffered 
personal injuries on April 25, 1977, while 
a passenger in an automobile. Although 
the court was not deciding the issue of 
when the statute of limitations began to 
run, the court stated in a footnote to the 
decision that the three-year statute of 
limitations expired on April 25, 1980.39 
In Borello v. U.S. Oil Co.40 the court, 
in determining when "discovery" oc-
curred, stated: "Fishburn's diagnosis and 
findings were made on Oc?. 30 , 1979. If 
this is the date on which 'discovery ' took 
place, the complaint filed on Nov. 25, 
1981, was timely filed as being within 
three years o f discovery, the date which 
commenced the running of the period of 
limitations. The period of limitations, if 
properly so computed, would not have 
run until October of 1982.''41 
The quote is ambiguous as to whether 
the first day should be counted. If the 
Hester??2 case is the law, then the court 
intended to say that the period of limita-
tions would not have run until Oct. 30, 
1982. One can' t help but wonder why 
the day of the month was not specifically 
stated. 
Conclusion 
Resolution of whether day one, the day 
an action accrues, is to be included in 
computing the statute of limitation is 
critically important because an incorrect 
computation can destroy the claimant's 
right, as well as the claimant's remedy????? 
In view of the number of times that this 
issue bas arisen, the supreme court should 
clear up the confusion at an early date. 
Judges, lawyers and litigants should not 
have to guess as to the result. ln the 
meantime, counsel, to be safe, should 
continue to include the day of accrual in 
computing the time when the cause of 
action accrues . 
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